Rationales for indirect speech: The theory of the strategic speaker

Why a hint appears exactly where the asker isn't sure of the answer — and why it stays off the record even when both people know.

Lee, J. J. & Pinker, S. (2010). Rationales for indirect speech: The theory of the strategic speaker. Psychological Review, 117(3), 785–807.

Type

Journal article

Find it

doi.org/10.1037/a0019688

Checked

Against the abstract, 16 September 2026

Why it is on the list

The strategic speaker hints because they are uncertain of whether the hearer is cooperative or antagonistic. The abstract’s example is bribing a policeman who may be corrupt or honest. In the model, a veiled bribe can be taken up by the corrupt one or passed over by the honest one. Ordinary interactions have the same payoff structure with emotional penalties instead of legal ones, whenever the request is implicitly forbidden by the kind of relationship the two people are in.

Even when the hearer’s willingness is known, indirectness still buys something: higher-order deniability, which the authors describe as preempting certainty, gossip, and common knowledge of the request. A hint that both parties fully understand is still not a thing either of them said.

For week 3, ask what the wording lets either person decline or leave off the record. Uncertainty about the answer is one possibility; the known-willingness case above is another reason to stay indirect.