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Week 7: Compromising reflections

Recovering a screen's contents from its reflection in glasses, a teapot, or an eyeball, at a distance and after the fact

5 April 2027

A surface nobody designed to be a display can be one, which makes this channel a property of the room rather than of the device.

A display’s light does not stop at the edge of the screen: it reflects off whatever is in the room, including surfaces nobody would think to call reflective. Backes, Dürmuth and Unruh’s 2008 paper “Compromising Reflections” recovered readable text from a telescope trained on a monitor’s reflection in a teapot, a pair of eyeglasses, a spoon and a plastic bottle. The cornea is the result people remember, and it is not in that paper: the 2009 follow-up, “Tempest in a Teapot”, added the reflection in the user’s own eye, along with diffuse reflections from a wall or a shirt and computational deconvolution to recover detail the reflecting surface’s curvature had smeared.

The two papers are worth reading in order, because the second is what turns the first from a demonstration into a measured claim: it reports the information-theoretic limit on what a diffuse reflection can carry, which is the difference between “this worked once” and “here is how far it goes.”

The result matters less for any particular surface than for the general claim it establishes: a channel does not need to be intentional or even electronic to count. Light bouncing off an incidental object is exactly as much a side channel as a chip’s current draw, and the same question this course keeps asking — what would it cost to close this? — has a genuinely different answer here, since the “leak” is a property of geometry and optics that no software patch touches.

Outline

Readings

  1. Michael Backes, Markus Duermuth and Dominique Unruh (2008). Compromising Reflections, or How to Read LCD Monitors Around the Corner. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2008, 158-169.
  2. Michael Backes, Tongbo Chen, Markus Duermuth, Hendrik P. A. Lensch and Martin Welk (2009). Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2009, 315-327.
  3. Joe Loughry and David A. Umphress (2002). Information Leakage from Optical Emanations. ACM TISSEC 5(3), 262-289.

Teaching team