The rule you have believed

since you were four

SLOP2710 · Week 5 · Act II begins

Around 1970

Banks replaced one queue per teller with one queue for all tellers.

Customers hated it.

It looked longer. It was longer.

Four tellers. Same customers.

What does merging the lines buy?

Nineteen minutes → six

And the unluckiest tenth: 43 minutes → 13

Nobody is working faster. There are still four tellers.

W one line
—
W four lines
—
W₉₀ one line
—
W₉₀ four lines
—
stranded teller-min an hour
—
What to watch: In four lines, look for a pink window: that teller is free, somebody is waiting, and the dashed line shows who. The chip counts what it costs in teller-minutes an hour. Switch the rope to one line and the count goes to zero — not by luck, but because a free window and a waiting customer can no longer coexist.

If anyone is waiting,

no window is free.

That is the entire mechanism.

But the gain shrinks with size

Staffing ≈ work + √work

  • 4 tellers’ work → ~2 of safety → 50% overhead
  • 100 tellers’ work → ~10 of safety → 10% overhead

Four reasons not to pool

  • generalists may be slower than specialists
  • pooling costs travel
  • it couples things that were independent
  • some partitions are deliberate (the express lane, the resus bay)

And the real reason people hated four lines

With four lanes, yours is fastest one time in four.

So three-quarters of the time, somebody who arrived after you leaves before you.

And you watch them do it.

The fairness claim, properly

  • needs no information about you
  • verifiable from inside the queue
  • strategy-proof, except by arriving earlier
  • needs no justification at the counter

FCFS is not what four queues implement.

It is what one queue implements.

What it costs

Ignores job length → week 6

Ignores urgency → week 7

Tests free time → who could be here at 9am?

Arrival order is not a fact the queue discovers.

It is an allocation that already happened, somewhere else,

before anybody reached the door.

Next: the free lunch

and who pays for it